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Academic literature is giving increased 
consideration to the use of performance 
measurement systems, notably the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC). However, there has been 
limited empirical investigation into the 
particular benefits that result from the use 
of the BSC (Ittner and Larcker, 1998). This 
study empirically examines how the BSC 
has been applied in practice and whether 
different BSC designs result in varying 
performance outcomes. Data is from a 
cross sectional survey, which provided a 
sample of 92 Australian firms using BSC. It 
is hypothesised that the BSC provides 
greater benefits when 1) cause and effect 
logic is used between measures 2) non-
financial measures are tied to 
compensation and 3) implemented at 
multiple levels within the organisation. 
Results support the first proposition, 
although cause and effect logic appears to 
be more important if the BSC is tied to 
compensation. These results are discussed, 
and implications for practice and future 
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Introduction  
Since its popularisation by Kaplan and 
Norton (1992, 1993), the concept of the 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) has seen an 
evolutionary development in practitioner 
based literature. Originally conceived as a 
diagnostic tool that provided managers with 
a comprehensive assessment of 
organisational performance, Kaplan & 
Norton (1996a) soon reported that 
organisations had begun to experiment with 
the use of the BSC as a management by 
objectives type system as well as 
integration of the BSC as a central feature 
of strategic management processes.  
 
Key aspects of the BSC to emerge in this 
development were an emphasis on cause 
and effect relationships between 
perspectives and measures, interactive 
communication throughout organisational 
hierarchies and use of BSC metrics in 
compensation contracts (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996a, 1996b). Later writings 
suggested that the BSC may also facilitate 
the management of intangibles and serve as 
the basis of managing competing 
stakeholder objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 
2001, 2004). Central to each stage of this 
normative development has been the 
argument that the BSC will provide 
performance benefits to the organisation. 
 
In the academic literature there has been a 
developing stream of research that has 
responded to calls for the investigation of 
BSC performance impacts (Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998). To date empirical inquiry 
has considered issues of performance 
variation between BSC and non-BSC 
adopting firms (Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 
2003; Davis and Albright, 2004), 
managerial perceptions of the general 
performance outcomes of BSC 
implementation and use (Malmi, 2001; 
Malina and Selto, 2001) and the  
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association between non-financial 
performance measures and financial 
outcomes (Said, et.al, 2003; Bryant, Jones 
and Widener, 2004). These initial 
investigations, however, have provided less 
than definitive findings as to the particular 
performance benefits that may result from 
BSC application. 
 
While most of these studies have been 
confined to small samples or single firm 
case studies, or have used external data 
sources that may not appropriately proxy 
for BSC design and use, a more 
fundamental issue exists in the study of 
BSC performance impacts. In view of the 
evolutionary development of the BSC, 
organisations can develop scorecards that 
have a range of different technical designs 
and styles of use. Two descriptive studies 
have considered this issue thus far (Malmi, 
2001; Speckbacher, Bischof and Pfeiffer, 
2003).  
 
These studies suggest that common to all 
BSCs is the inclusion of both financial and 
non-financial indicators grouped around a 
number of key organisational perspectives, 
but that beyond this baseline BSC a range 
of design choices exists. These include the 
extent to which cause and effect logic is 
built into the BSC design, the extent to 
which compensation is tied to non-financial 
measures, and the extent to which it has 
been implemented on multiple levels of the 
organisational hierarchy (Kaplan and 
Norton 1996a, 1996b, 2001, 2004; Malmi, 
2001; Speckbacher, et.al, 2003). Given 
these alternatives in design, performance 
outcomes are likely to vary contingent upon 
the stage of development adopted, however 
there is little evidence of this (Chenhall, 
2005). 
 
This paper considers whether different BSC 
design choices, reflected in normative and 
academic literature, impact upon the types 
of benefits and overall outcomes derived by 
organisations. This is an important research 
question for a number of reasons. First, 
BSC adoption rates have been 
comparatively high relative to other 
management innovations (Speckbacher, 
et.al, 2003). With many organisations 
investing in the BSC, its usefulness and 
impacts on performance is a particularly 
salient issue (Atkinson, et.al, 1997; Ittner & 
Larcker, 1998; Chenhall, 2005).   
 
Second, criticisms of the BSC (Norreklit 
2000, 2003) and uncertainty surrounding 
the extent to which firms achieve real 
benefits from implementation and use 
(Malmi 2001; Malina and Selto 2001; Ittner 
and Larcker, 2003) may be at least partially 
attributable to sub-optimal design and 
application in practice (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996b; Ittner and Larcker, 2005).  
 
Third, as the BSC is largely a practice 
derived innovation, theoretical arguments 
explaining how and why particular 
outcomes are realised are still at the 
developmental stage in academic literature. 
Empirical examination of these issues will 
contribute to the emerging stream of 
literature considering the design and use of 
contemporary performance measurement 
systems and add to the development of a 
more grounded theoretical framework 
explaining how these systems act to drive 
organisational outcomes (Malmi, 2001; 
Malina and Selto, 2001; Ittner, et.al, 2003; 
Speckbacher, et.al, 2003; Davis and 
Albright, 2004; Tuomela, 2005; Chenhall, 
2005). 
 
To examine this research question, data 
from a cross sectional survey of 92 
Australian organisations were considered.  
 
The first part of the data analysis tests 
propositions relating to three key 
characteristics of BSC design and use and 
their impacts on benefits. Results show that 
the use of cause and effect logic between 
measures was associated with the 11 BSC 
related benefits identified and with two of 
the three overall success outcomes. The 
tying of compensation to non-financial 
measures of BSC was associated with only 
four of the 11 benefits and did not impact 
any of the overall success outcomes. 
Finally, the extent to which the BSC had 
been implemented throughout the 
organisational hierarchy had no significant 
impact on benefits or success outcomes.  
 
Further sensitivity tests were then 
undertaken to understand how the 
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combination of cause and effect along with 
compensation impacted upon BSC benefits. 
The analysis found that when compensation 
was linked to non-financial indicators, 
greater benefits were achieved when cause 
and effect was also included as a BSC 
characteristic, suggesting that an interaction 
effect exists between these design choices. 
 
The paper is organised into the following 
four sections. The first section reviews the 
relevant BSC literature and outlines 
propositions concerning the three key 
design characteristics and associated 
organisational benefits and outcomes. The 
second section considers the research 
method and design. The third section 
presents the findings from proposition 
testing and further sensitivity analyses with 
the final section providing a discussion of 
these results and their implications for 
research and practice. 
 
Literature Review and Proposition 
Development 
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1993, 1996a, 
1996b, 2001) decompose the strategic 
benefits of the BSC into a number of 
components. The first is that management 
will be able to clarify and gain consensus 
about strategy. This is through the process 
of senior mangers working together to 
‘translate its business units strategy into 
specific strategic objectives’ (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996b: 10). Kaplan and Norton 
(2001) argue that the BSC will facilitate the 
communication of strategy throughout the 
organisation, enabling the alignment of 
personal and departmental goals. As part of 
this strategic process, long term strategic 
initiatives will be identified and aligned 
through a reduced emphasis on short term 
financial measures, and a greater focus 
upon drivers of long term success (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996b, 2001).  
 
One of the most innovative aspects of the 
BSC (as argued by Kaplan and Norton, 
1996b) is that the BSC provides a strategic 
learning framework where the capability for 
organisational learning is able to take place 
at an executive level. It is argued that by 
creating a feedback loop around the 
strategic process, managers will be able 
question strategic priorities and the 
assumptions made, leading to a realignment 
of strategy and organisational objectives 
where necessary. Central to all of this is 
that through the implementation of the 
BSC, organisations will gain superior 
performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 
1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2001). However, as 
argued above, the extent to which 
organisations gain these benefits and 
performance outcomes may be impacted by 
the design and use characteristics of the 
BSC. 
Cause and Effect Logic 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a, 1996b, 2000) 
argue that one of the distinguishing features 
of the Balanced Scorecard, relative to other 
systems of performance evaluation, is the 
use of cause and effect logic to clearly 
identify the critical drivers of strategic 
outcomes.  They write that identification, 
and subsequent measurement, of these 
drivers allows managers to effectively map 
strategy through a causal model of key 
performance indicators.  From this it is 
argued that management will benefit from a 
greater understanding and consensus of the 
activities required to drive future 
performance. Theoretically at least, this 
model also provides a basis for feed-
forward control, where managers are able to 
detect and attempt to correct the underlying 
sources of negative deviations in leading 
indicators, which ultimately results in 
superior long term financial performance. 
While the idea of cause and effect is 
intuitively appealing there has been some 
discussion about what cause and effect 
actually means. Norreklit (2000) argues that 
the relationship between the four 
perspectives of the BSC is not causal but 
logical. Norreklit (2000) argues from a 
philosophy of science perspective that the 
BSC makes invalid assumptions about the 
causal relationships between performance 
indicators. Furthermore, these invalid 
assumptions may actually result in 
dysfunctional behaviour in organisations 
and as a consequence lower organisational 
performance.  
 
Bukh and Malmi (2005) take a more 
pragmatic approach to the issue and argue 
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that if establishing significant correlations 
between measures and causal chains was 
immediately obvious and easy then the need 
for strategy or even management is 
diminished. They argue that establishing 
associations between outcomes and inputs 
that are assumed to have the greatest impact 
on these outcomes is what developing cause 
and effect is about; and in many 
organisations these relationships can be 
discovered and attuned through a process of 
learning and experimentation over time (see 
also Tuomela, 2005).  
 
Empirical research is also somewhat 
unclear on the benefits of using the cause 
and effect characteristic in BSC design. 
Malina and Selto (2001), Malmi (2001) and 
Ittner, et.al. (2003) all found very little 
application of the cause and effect principle 
in the companies they considered, and as 
such were only suggestive in their 
discussions of the usefulness of cause and 
effect logic.  
 
Davis and Albright (2004), in their study of 
bank branches, found that the organisational 
units that used the BSC had better financial 
performance that those that had not 
implemented the BSC. Notably, the BSC 
implementing units had designed them with 
cause and effect logic, although this does 
not allow isolation of the effects of cause 
and effect logic itself. Malina and Selto 
(2004) anecdotally observed the existence 
of logic and finality in the perceptions of 
managers in their case study, yet observed 
little evidence of causality when measuring 
the relationship between metrics contained 
in the BSC of their case organisation. 
Bryant, et.al. (2004) also examined the idea 
of causality between financial and non-
financial performance measures. While they 
were able to provide some empirical 
evidence of associations, the data used was 
from external sources and hence proxied, 
rather than directly measured, elements of 
the BSC.  
 
Furthermore, associations between financial 
and non-financial measures may exist 
without cause and effect logic being 
purposefully implemented into BSC 
design.Although both the empirical and 
theoretical evidence surrounding the 
usefulness and applicability of cause and 
effect logic is inconclusive, from a 
pragmatic perspective the notion remains 
appealing.  Given the normative assertions 
of Kaplan and Norton concerning its 
effectiveness and centrality to the BSC as a 
distinctive strategic management system, 
the ex ante expectation is that BSCs that are 
designed with causal links between 
measures or between measures and 
perspectives will enable greater 
performance outcomes. This is formally 
stated as the following proposition: 
 
P1: Organisations that have cause and 
effect relationships between measures in 
their BSC will gain more benefits from 
their BSC than those without cause and 
effect relationships in their BSC. 
Compensation Link to BSC Non-
Financial Measures 
Kaplan and Norton (1996b, 2001b) argue 
that attaching incentives to measures is a 
potentially powerful mechanism to align the 
efforts of individuals to the achievement of 
organisational strategy, and to create a more 
balanced focus between short and long term 
objectives. They also suggest that a 
strategically linked scorecard with a 
compensation element included in the 
design will create the sense that the 
achievement of strategy is everyone’s 
responsibility, motivating individuals to 
consciously consider the relationships 
between their activities and strategic 
outcomes. 
 
The BSC research literature to date has 
presented limited evidence on the benefits 
of incorporating reward and compensation 
into BSC design. Malmi (2001) found 13 of 
the 17 organisations he interviewed had 
incentives attached to their BSC, although 
he did not provide any evidence on whether 
impacted BSC effectiveness. Speckbacher, 
et.al (2003) also examined the extent to 
which incentives were linked to the BSC. 
Out of 38 organisations, 27 had incentives 
tied to the BSC, however the extent to 
which this impacted either benefits of the 
BSC or organisational performance is not 
considered.  
 
 JAMAR Vol. 6 · Number 2 · 2008 
21 
Tuomela (2005), in the analysis of his case 
company, found that compensation was not 
linked to BSC measures as staff in the 
organisation felt that attaching bonuses to 
measures reduced the power of the BSC to 
be used interactively as a learning vehicle, 
at least in the early stages of 
implementation. Although not studying the 
BSC directly, Bryant, et.al (2004) argued 
that the right focus on non-financial 
performance measures will improve 
organisational performance. They found 
some empirical evidence to support this, 
and also suggested that the associations 
between non-financial indicators and 
financial outcomes are stronger in those 
organisations that link executive 
compensation to non-financial performance 
indicators relative to those that don’t. 
 
Despite the limited empirical evidence, the 
assertions of Kaplan and Norton are well 
grounded in theory. Bonner and Sprinkle 
(2002), in reviewing the theoretical 
perspectives of expectancy, agency, goal-
setting and social-cognitive, argues each 
shares essentially the same underlying 
proposition - that the presence of 
‘incentives increase(s) effort and increased 
effort leads to improvements in 
performance’ (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002: 
310). They consider that this relationship is 
principally due to three characteristics of 
effort: direction, which is the tasks that the 
individuals focuses on; duration, which is 
how long individuals devotes themselves to 
the task; and intensity, which is the amount 
of attention individuals devote to the task.  
 
Hence attaching incentives to desired 
outcomes will motivate high levels of effort 
direction, duration and intensity. In addition 
to providing increased motivation, under 
situations in which multiple dimensions of 
performance exist, the provision of 
incentives may also serve an informational 
role (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; 
Merchant, 1998).  
 
The informativeness principle contends that 
any measures of performance that provide 
information on effort levels of the agent 
should be included in the compensation 
contract (Holmstrom, 1979; Prendergast, 
1999). Increasing the scope of the 
compensation contract enables greater 
capture of an agent’s private information, 
limiting information rents and allowing for 
greater management coordination of 
employee’s effort allocations (Bonner and 
Sprinkle, 2002). By comprising multiple 
indicators and dimensions of performance, 
the BSC provides an opportunity to broaden 
the compensation contract, acting to direct 
the effort direction, duration and intensity 
towards those activities that are believed to 
drive the long-term performance of the 
organisation. 
 
Traditionally, compensation has been tied 
to financial measures (Widener, 2006). As 
the BSC contains both financial and non-
financial measures, many BSC 
organisations may have compensation tied 
to financial measures that are part of the 
BSC by default rather than by design. 
Consequently, the impact of compensation 
on BSC design has greater discriminate 
validity when compensation is tied to non-
financial measures. Based on the above 
argument, the ex ante expectation is that 
organisations that attach incentives to non-
financial BSC measures yield greater 
benefits. This is stated formally as the 
following proposition: 
 
P2: Organisations that have 
compensation tied to the non-financial 
measures in their BSC will gain more 
benefits than those without 
compensation tied to the non-financial 
measures in their BSC. 
Extent of Implementation 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a, 1996b, 2001a) 
argue that a number of the key strengths of 
the BSC devolve from the ability of the 
BSC to cascade the organisations’ strategy, 
and provide feedback loops, through the 
organisational hierarchy. In order to do this 
the BSC would need to be implemented at 
more than just the SBU level. Kaplan and 
Norton (1996) argue that the design of a 
corporate BSC enables a common 
framework for the themes and vision of the 
organisation. This provides a platform for 
the SBUs to develop their BSCs, which 
should be aligned to a well defined strategy. 
Based on the SBU BSC, functional units, 
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departments, and individuals are able to 
develop BSCs that are congruent with the 
SBU, and in this way ’the SBU scorecard is 
cascaded down to local responsibility 
centres’ (Kaplan and Norton, 1996: 36). 
 
Very little BSC research literature has 
considered the issue of the extent of BSC 
implementation throughout an organisations 
hierarchy and its related benefits, with the 
major focus being on BSC use at the SBU 
level. Davis and Albright (2004) found that 
the BSC had been implemented from an 
individual level through to a branch level. 
While the financial performance of BSC 
branches was better than non-BSC 
branches, no insights are provided as to 
whether a BSC implemented at more 
hierarchical levels gives greater benefits. 
Speckbacher, et.al. (2003) found that the 
majority of the organisations in their survey 
had implemented the BSC at a business unit 
level, with few firms implementing down to 
the individual level. This finding is 
consistent with Malmi’s (2001) study, 
where the majority of BSC applications 
existed at a business unit level.  
 
Kaplan and Norton (2001) argue that the 
BSC facilitates the process of making sure 
that employees understand what the 
strategy is, in order to increase the 
probability that they conduct their activities 
towards the achievement of the strategy. 
This is an essential component of the 
communication process in an organisation. 
Malina and Selto (2001), drawing on 
communication research (e.g. Tucker, et.al, 
1996; Goodman, 1998; Barker and 
Camarata, 1998; de Hass and Kleingeld, 
1999) argue that communication is enabled 
through three aspects; processes and 
messages, support of organisational culture, 
and creation and exchange of knowledge.  
 
First, they argue that the BSC provides 
processes and messages that are 
understandable as the BSC creates a 
common ‘language’ through the 
organisation to describe phenomena. 
Second, the BSC supports the 
organisational culture through 
communicating clearly the established 
goals, values and behaviour patterns. This is 
manifest through goals that are shared 
between the organisation, managers and 
employees which can be reflected in 
metrics implemented through the 
organisation. Third, the BSC converts some 
of the strategic tacit and objective 
knowledge of senior management into 
metrics which is then communicated to 
lower levels of the organisation through the 
cascading of the BSC. In the same manner, 
at lower levels of the organisation, 
knowledge of how activities are linked to 
organisational strategy is also created by the 
systematic process of considering metric 
design and its impact on higher levels of the 
BSC. 
 
Related to this is the operational linking of 
objectives of departments and individuals to 
the SBU and corporate BSCs. It would 
seem that unless the lower level activities in 
the organisation are overtly linked to the 
BSC the benefits of the BSC that depend on 
lower level activities are unlikely to be 
manifest. The progressive cascading down 
of BSCs which are linked are more likely to 
produce activities at lower levels in the 
organisation that are congruent with higher 
level BSCs than a more ad hoc design of 
measures through the aligning of 
accountabilities. 
 
Based on the normative arguments of 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a, 1996b) and the 
limited research literature, the ex ante 
expectation is that the more organisations 
implement the BSC through their 
hierarchical levels the greater the benefits 
obtained will be. This is stated formally as 
the following proposition: 
 
P3: Organisations that have 
implemented the BSC throughout the 
organisation to team and/or individual 
levels will gain more benefits than those 




Sample and Survey Response 
The data for this study were obtained from 
a cross-sectional survey.  The sample for 
this study was obtained from the CPA 
Australia (Certified Practicing Accountants 
of Australia) database. The CPA Australia 
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is the largest professional accounting body 
in Australia, with the majority of its 
members working in industry and 
commerce. Their database, which is 
regularly updated, provided an appropriate 
source from which to draw the sample for 
this study.  
 
The survey sample was randomly selected, 
but was representative of the population 
sample in terms of size and industry. The 
mail-out to 2400 members was conducted 
between October, 2004 and March, 2005 in 
two stages. The unit of analysis was the 
strategic business unit (SBU), which 
includes single business organisations 
(Chenhall and Langfield Smith, 1998).  
 
Each respondent represented a unique SBU 
in the survey sample. Respondents were 
classified as having ‘financial control’ as 
their primary job function, with job titles 
such as Chief Financial Officer, Chief 
Accountant and Financial Controller, and 
are thus likely to have sufficient knowledge 
of the BSC in their firm. Questionnaires 
were personally addressed to these 
members, although all responses are 
anonymous. The package included the 
questionnaire and a cover letter, which 
offered a benchmark report and invitation to 
an industry seminar as incentives to 
respond.  
 
From this, a total of 426 surveys were 
returned, representing an initial response 
rate of 17.8%. Given that the mail-out 
process followed many of the suggestions 
by Dillman (2000), including a follow-up 
postcard two weeks after each stage, the 
moderate response rate is likely to be 
attributable to the length of the survey (15 
pages, due to requirements additional to this 
study).  However, this response rate is still 
comparable to those obtained elsewhere in 
the management accounting literature (see 
the review of Young, 1996). 
 
The survey asked respondents to indicate 
their level of consideration/adoption of the 
BSC. 18 firms (4%) stated that the BSC had 
been ’implemented then abandoned’, while 
311 (73%) indicated that the BSC had not 
been considered. Firms stating that the BSC 
was either ‘gaining acceptance’ (58 firms, 
14%) or ‘used extensively’ (39 firms, 9%), 
were included in the study. The average 
time of implementation for firms that used 
the BSC extensively was 4.5 years, with 
84% reporting that the BSC has been 
implemented for 2 years or more.  From 
this sample of 97 firms, five additional 
firms had to be removed. When asked about 
the particular perspectives included in the 
BSC, four indicated that they only had the 
financial perspective. The last firm had 
significant missing data. The authors were 
unable to determine whether these firms 
had, in fact, implemented a BSC, and thus 
they were removed from the analysis. This 
left a usable sample size of 92 firms 
(21.6%) that were using a BSC.  
 
Visual inspection of the remaining 92 cases 
revealed that there were a small number of 
responses with some missing values. To 
maintain sample size, missing values were 
imputed. Little’s MCAR test showed that 
the data was missing completely at random 
(Chi-square=451.625, DF=441, p>0.10), 
meaning that any imputation method can be 
used reliably (Hair, et.al 1998). The 
expectation-maximisation (E-M) was used 
to impute the missing data. E-M is an 
iterative process in which mean, covariance 
and correlation parameters of the sample 
are protected (Hair, et.al, 1998). Lastly, 
non-response bias was tested by comparing 
the first 20% of the BSC sample with the 
last 20%. Analysis of categorical and scale 
data indicated no significant differences. 
Industry and Size 
Industry classification and size of 
organisations is outlined in Table One. T-
tests between company and SBU size show 
a significant difference between BSC 
adopters and non-adopters in terms of 
company size (p=0.013), but not SBU size 
(p=0.854). The result of company size is 
consistent with previous literature (Hoque 
and James, 2000; Speckbacher, et.al, 2003). 
Visual inspection of industry classification 
indicates few notable trends.
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Table One : Industry (GICS) and Size 
  Non-BSC Users  BSC Users 
  # %  # % 
Energy  4 1.3  2 2.4 
Materials  27 9.1  7 8.2 
Industrials  99 33.3  23 27.1 
Consumer discretionary  64 21.5  12 14.1 
Consumer staples  32 10.8  10 11.8 
Health care  17 5.7  5 5.9 
Financials  35 11.8  15 17.6 
Information technology  8 2.7  7 8.2 
Telecommunications  8 2.7  1 1.2 
Utilities  3 1.0  3 3.5 
       
Total Firms  297   85  
       
       
Size (average employees)       
   Company  6,797   17,296  
   SBU  564   627  
       
Note:  33 non-BSC users and 7 BSC users did not fill in GICS codes 
 
Variable Measurement and Descriptive 
Data 
Respondents were asked about three 
characteristics of their BSC design (the use 
of cause and effect logic in the development 
of the BSC, the linking of compensation to 
non-financial measures and the extent that 
the BSC has been implemented throughout 
the organisational hierarchy), as well as 
eleven benefits and three outcome 
indicators measuring various aspects of the 
success of the BSC. Prior to sending out the 
survey, the items were pilot tested with two 
senior accounting managers at a division of 
a large international consumer goods 
company, with students in an accounting 
MBA class and academic staff. Piloting of 
the survey instrument resulted in a number 
of minor changes, mainly to the wording of 
questions in the survey. As most of the data 
is either categorical or single item 
measures, pilot testing focused on the 
convergent understanding of the survey 
items. It is this convergence between pilot 
test subjects, particularly in cases where 
little theory exists to guide development, 
that essentially determines the validity of 




2002; see also Bergkvist and Rossiter, 
2007). Furthermore, as the two multiple 
item measures in this study (link to 
compensation and extent of 
implementation) are indices or ‘formative’ 
constructs (as opposed to reflective – see 
Bisbe, Batista-Foguet and Chenhall, 2007), 
the use of traditional validation techniques, 
such as confirmatory factor analysis and 
Cronbach’s Alpha, are inappropriate 
(Rossiter, 2002). Descriptive data is shown 
for each of the three aspects of BSC design 
in Tables Two, Three and Four, and for 
benefits and outcomes in Table Five. 
 
As shown in Table Two, a large number of 
organisations do not use cause and effect 
logic (43.5%), despite this being considered 
a central tenet of BSC design in practitioner 
literature. Some organisations also 
indicated that they only used cause and 
effect logic between perspectives. Given the 
simplicity of this type of logic, it is likely to 
have few beneficial outcomes unless 
measures within and between perspectives 
are also linked together. These seven firms 
were not considered as having used cause 
and effect logic in testing the first 
proposition.
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Table Two:  Use of Cause and Effect Logic 
 # % 
Between perspectives 7 7.6% 
Between measures 13 14.1% 
Both perspectives and measures 32 34.8% 
Not used 40 43.5% 
   
 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agree with the 
statement that ‘non-financial data is used 
for management (staff) compensation’ on 
two seven point Likert-type scales, one for 
management and one for staff. The scale 
was anchored with ‘strongly disagree’ (1), 
‘strongly agree’ (7) and ‘neutral’ (4). The 
breakdown of the responses is shown in 
Table 3.  52.2% of firms agree (a response 
of five or greater) with the statement for 
management compensation, and 41.3% for 
staff. Firms in either of these categories 
were classed as having compensation tied to 
the BSC (a total of 51 firms, with 35 of 
these compensating both management and 
staff based on BSC measures).
Table Three:  Compensation Link to Non-Financial Measures 
 Management Staff 
 # % # % 
1 = Strongly Disagree 7 7.6 13 14.1 
2 8 8.7 11 12.0 
3 10 10.9 11 12.0 
4 = Neutral 19 20.7 19 20.7 
5 16 17.4 15 16.3 
6 22 23.9 15 16.3 
7 = Strongly Agree 10 10.9 8 8.7 
     
 
 
Table Four displays the levels that the BSC 
has been implemented. The BSC was 
considered implemented at a particular 
organisational level if measures for that 
level had been defined, and targets had been 
set for those measures.  Respondents 
answered questions separately for measures 
and targets, respectively.  The finding that 
most firms have implemented the BSC at 
the SBU level (91.2%) is consistent with 
both normative suggestions and previous 
empirical work. Kaplan and Norton (1996b) 
argue that the SBU level is the principle 
level of implementation as the BSC is 
primarily a mechanism to translate strategy 
into quantifiable measures. The studies of 
Malmi (2001) and Speckbacher, et.al 
(2003) both observe that this is being 
mirrored in practice. 
Table Four:  Extent of Implementation 
Organisation Level Corporate SBU Unit Department Team Individual 
# Firms 88 83 76 68 66 57 
% Firms 96.7 91.2 83.5 74.7 72.5 62.6 
       
Note:  One firm did not complete this section (total of 91 firms included) 
 
 
However other findings regarding 
implementation throughout the hierarchy 
are somewhat surprising. For instance, 
Speckbacher, et.al (2003) reported 55% 
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implementation at the corporate level, 23% 
implementation at plant and department 
levels, 10% in teams and 3% at the 
employee level. The current study reports 
that the BSC has been implemented at the 
corporate level in almost all firms (96.7%), 
and to a far greater extent at lower levels of 
the organisational hierarchy. Of particular 
note is that 72.5% and 62.6% of firms have 
implemented at the team and individual 
levels respectively. As suggested in 
proposition 3, this cascading of the 
scorecard to lower levels might reflect 
potential performance benefits from doing 
so. Kaplan and Norton (1996b, 2001) write 
that the BSC can be used as a mechanism to 
communicate strategy throughout the 
organisation, with such communication 
facilitating the alignment of individual 
action to strategic goals. 
 
The questionnaire included a list of 11 
benefits and three outcomes. While the 
benefits included were identified from 
previous literature, they centred on the 
fundamental purpose of the BSC as a 
device used to develop, communicate and 
implement strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 2001). Benefits 
and outcomes were measured on seven 
point Likert-type scales. Respondents were 
asked to indicate the extent to which the 
BSC has helped achieve each benefit. 
Scales were anchored with ‘strongly agree’ 
and ‘strongly disagree’, with the middle 
response labelled as ‘undecided’. Outcomes 
were anchored as ‘very successful’ and 
‘very unsuccessful’ for overall success, ‘no 
dollar improvements’ and ‘significant dollar 
improvements’ for dollar improvements 
from BSC implementation, and ‘not at all’ 
and ‘fully’ for meeting strategic objectives. 
The average response of benefits and 
outcomes for all BSC users is outlined in 
Table Five in descending order (with 
regards to average benefits). 
 






Stronger consideration for non-financial performance drivers 5.35 
More focus on our strategy 5.15 
Clarifying and communicating strategy 4.99 
Link long term strategic planning to short term activities/actions 4.84 
Provide a common language for staff to communicate 4.83 
Better consideration to stakeholders  4.82 
Developing strategy 4.78 
Enable managers to question the relevance of strategic objectives 4.47 
Provide a forum for individuals to share specific knowledge 4.29 
Reduce management focus on short term financial measures 4.12 
Enhance the investment in intangibles 4.00 
  
Outcomes  
Ability to meet strategic objectives of the organisation 4.23 
Overall success of BSC initiative 4.01 
Dollar improvements from BSC implementation 3.91 
  
Note:  Total Sample = 92  
 
 
The descriptive data suggests that on 
average the BSC is providing a number of 
benefits to Australian firms, particularly in 
terms of developing, communicating and 
directing focus on strategy. It appears, 
though, that while the BSC has helped 
managers place greater attention on non-
financial drivers, it has not reduced the 
focus on short-term financial measures. 
This is an unusual finding considering that 
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the BSC was initially developed on the 
basis of considerable critique over the 
inadequacy of financial measures (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1993; Speckbacher, et.al, 
2003). The result may indicate, however, 
that non-financial measures are 
complementing, rather than substituting for, 
financial measures. This is also supported 
by reports that a very high percentage of 
firms continue to use budgets (Ekholm and 
Wallin, 2001; Sivabalan, et.al, 2005).  
 
In contrast to Speckbacher, et.al (2003), the 
study here provides some evidence that the 
BSC provides greater consideration to 
stakeholders. This result is not surprising in 
light of the extent of use of non-traditional 
perspectives. In another section of the 
survey, respondents were asked to indicate 
what perspectives they included in their 
BSC. While the traditional perspectives of 
financial, customer, internal process and 
learning and growth, recorded the highest 
use, a significant number of organisations 
included non-traditional perspectives, such 
as environment (50%), community (53%), 
supplier (47%) and government (49%). 
Consistent with Speckbacher, et.al (2003), 
though, is that the BSC is providing little 
enhancement in the investment of 
intangibles. 
 
Finally, while on average respondents 
agreed that the BSC has helped in achieving 
most of the benefits at least to some extent, 
outcomes from BSC implementation, in 
terms of overall success, dollar 
improvements and meeting strategic 
objectives, were fairly low. This suggests 
that on the whole, the success of the BSC 
has only been moderate in Australia, 




To test the three propositions, Mann-
Whitney U tests were conducted to test 
whether a significant difference exists 
between the inclusion or exclusion of each 
of the three design elements (cause and 
effect, link to compensation and high 
implementation). The Mann-Whitney U-test 
is the non-parametric equivalent of a two-
sample t-test, but is appropriate when data 
are not continuous, such as in the present 
study. Results for all three propositions are 
contained in Table Six   
Proposition 1 – Cause and Effect Logic 
The results for the first proposition show 
significant differences for all benefits, and 
for two of the outcome measures (the only 
non-significant result being the overall 
success of the initiative). These results 
support Kaplan and Norton’s claim that 
cause and effect is a central and necessary 
component of the BSC in order for an 
organisation to achieve high levels of 
benefits from its usage. 
Proposition 2 – Link to Compensation 
There is inconclusive support for the second 
proposition. Although ten of the 11 benefits 
and all three of the outcome measures had 
higher averages for the group that linked 
compensation to BSC non-financial 
measures, only four of these benefits were 
significantly higher, with none of the 
outcomes statistically different. It should be 
noted that there is little reason that benefits 
such as developing strategy or providing a 
common language should differ because of 
a compensation linkage to non-financials. 
However two in particular, reducing 
management focus on short term financials 
and linking long term plans to short term 
actions, would seem likely benefits received 
by firms that designed a BSC with a 
compensation element, however these were 
insignificant. 
Proposition 3 – Extent of Implementation 
For the third proposition, organisations 
were grouped as either having high or low 
levels of implementation. Organisations 
were included in the high implementation 
group if they had implemented the BSC at 
the team or individual level (68 firms). The 
remaining organisations were placed in the 
low implementation group (24 firms).1 
 
                                                 
1 As this classification is inherently subjective, a 
number of alternative coding schemes were used, 
including the use of another set of data items (not 
listed here).  The categorisation chosen appeared the 
most logical.  However, none of the other 
categorisations attempted resulted in any different 
statistical outcomes. 
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Table Six:  Tests of Propositions    
 Proposition 1 























Benefits          
Developing strategy 4.43 5.16 0.005** 4.61 4.92 0.234 4.54 4.87 0.432 
More focus on our strategy 4.83 5.49 0.004** 5.07 5.22 0.370 5.04 5.19 0.827 
Clarifying and communicating strategy 4.60 5.40 0.001** 4.80 5.14 0.105 4.83 5.04 0.602 
Reduce management focus on short term financial measures 3.81 4.44 0.047* 4.05 4.18 0.681 3.88 4.21 0.373 
Link long term strategic planning to short term actions 4.53 5.16 0.015* 4.76 4.90 0.360 4.54 4.94 0.140 
Provide a common language for staff to communicate 4.51 5.16 0.010** 4.85 4.80 0.961 4.75 4.85 0.808 
Provide a forum for individuals to share specific knowledge 3.98 4.62 0.055^ 4.24 4.33 0.840 4.25 4.31 0.711 
Stronger consideration for non-financial performance drivers 5.04 5.67 0.004** 5.00 5.63 0.007** 5.17 5.51 0.598 
Better consideration to stakeholders  4.40 5.24 0.001** 4.41 5.15 0.004** 4.96 4.76 0.470 
Enhance the investment in intangibles 3.62 4.40 0.002** 3.68 4.25 0.070^ 3.71 4.10 0.317 
Enable managers to question the relevance of strategic objs. 3.94 5.02 0.000** 4.12 4.75 0.014* 4.29 4.53 0.479 
          
Outcomes          
Overall success of BSC initiative 3.76 4.23 0.137 3.73 4.20 0.176 3.95 4.03 0.973 
Dollar improvements from BSC implementation 3.55 4.22 0.030* 3.67 4.05 0.210 4.29 3.81 0.224 
Ability to meet strategic objectives of the organisation 3.92 4.51 0.018* 4.13 4.31 0.396 4.11 4.27 0.576 
          
^ p<.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 




                                                                                                         V
ol. 6 · N
o. 2 · 2008 
28
 JAMAR Vol. 6 · Number 2 · 2008 
13 
 
Table Seven:  Additional Test of Cause and Effect and Compensation Link in BSC 
 No Compensation Link Compensation Link  











G3 v  
G4 
G1 v  
G3 
G2 v  
G4 
 #26 #15 Sig. #21 #30 Sig. Sig. Sig. 
Benefits         
Developing strategy 4.42 4.93 .185 4.43 5.27 .026* .965 .454 
More focus on our strategy 4.85 5.47 .023* 4.81 5.50 .105 .526 .870 
Clarifying and communicating strategy 4.62 5.13 .106 4.57 5.53 .008** .719 .353 
Reduce management focus on short term financial measures 3.92 4.27 .517 3.67 4.53 .050* .570 .677 
Link long term strategic planning to short term activities/actions 4.54 5.13 .132 4.52 5.17 .085^ .823 .774 
Provide a common language for staff to communicate 4.58 5.33 .036* 4.43 5.07 .079^ .824 .823 
Provide a forum for individuals to share specific knowledge 4.00 4.67 .186 3.95 4.60 .146 .838 .903 
Stronger consideration for non-financial performance drivers 4.81 5.33 .138 5.33 5.83 .070^ .110 .158 
Better consideration to stakeholders  4.19 4.80 .079^ 4.67 5.47 .026* .104 .163 
Enhance the investment in intangibles 3.42 4.13 .053^ 3.86 4.53 .051^ .416 .376 
Enable managers to question the relevance of strategic objectives 3.88 4.53 .143 4.00 5.27 .000** .808 .016* 
         
Outcomes         
Overall success of BSC initiative 3.84 3.57 .203 3.68 4.53 .028** .350 .067^ 
Dollar improvements from BSC implementation 3.53 3.89 .404 3.56 4.32 .082^ .983 .382 
Ability to meet strategic objectives of the organisation 3.89 4.46 .175 3.95 4.53 .073^ .796 .784 
         
^ p<.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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The averages reported in Table 6 for the 
organisations that have implemented at the 
team and individual levels are higher for all 
but one outcome and one benefit measure 
however there are no statistically significant 
differences. A number of other bases were 
also used for categorising firms as high and 
low implementers, but these had no notable 
impact on results. While no support is 
provided for the third proposition as the 
majority of firms have implemented the 
BSC to lower levels of the organisation it is 
likely that there is some benefit to doing so, 
although it has not been captured in this 
study. 
Additional Test on Cause and Effect and 
Compensation  
With strong support for proposition one and 
some support for proposition two, 
additional tests were run. These additional 
tests considers whether compensation and 
cause and effect characteristics contributed 
to BSC effects independently, or if there 
was some form of interaction effect 
between the two. Firms were partitioned 
into four groups based on the existence or 
absence of cause and effect and link from 
non-financial measures to compensation.  
The results of Mann-Whitney U-tests 
between groups are shown in Table 7. 
 
The tests demonstrate that the 
compensation characteristic has little 
independent effect on BSC benefits and 
outcomes (group one v three). When cause 
and effect is not part of the BSC design, the 
inclusion of compensation provides no 
significant difference in benefits. The 
results do provide evidence that the use of 
cause and effect logic has an independent 
effect on BSC benefits, although it appears 
to be more important when compensation is 
also included.  
 
All of the outcome measures and nine of the 
11 benefits were significantly higher when 
cause and effect logic was used with a BSC 
tied to compensation (group three v four). 
When the compensation link was absent, 
four of the benefit measures were 
significantly higher with the use of cause 
and effect, although all of the reported 
averages for benefits and two of the 
outcome measures were higher (group one 
v two). In comparing a BSC design with 
both compensation and cause and effect to 
one that only includes the latter (group two 
v four), only one benefit is significantly 
higher, although the outcome of ‘overall 
success’ is moderately significant. 
 
The additional tests, in conjunction with the 
initial proposition tests, suggest that linking 
non-financial BSC measures to 
compensation may not be a requisite for 
successful use of the BSC, and that cause 
and effect is the dominant characteristic 
considered in this study of BSC design. 
However, if compensation is included as 
part of BSC design, there appears to be an 
interaction effect with cause and effect. 
Whether the compensation characteristic is 
included or not may relate to the role that 
the BSC plays in the control package mix, 
or upon other contingent circumstances. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study was designed to find out how 
Balanced Scorecards have been applied in 
practice and whether different BSC designs 
result in varying benefits and performance 
outcomes. A number of interesting findings 
emerged. First, deriving measures using 
cause and effect logic seem to enhance 
perceived benefits and performance 
outcomes from the BSC. Given the wide 
range of benefits received, it is difficult to 
point out any single underlying factor 
driving these results. However, as cause and 
effect logic seemed to bring more benefits 
for firms that linked compensation to non-
financials, benefits could partly be due to 
this type of BSC making management by 
objectives based control system reflect what 
is truly believed to be of strategic 
importance in the organisation.  
 
The reliance on cause and effect may help 
to reduce and prioritise objectives, 
providing more focused target setting and 
accountabilities, compared to a BSC where 
objectives are grouped into perspectives but 
no clear understanding exists on their 
interdependencies. Balancing various 
outcome measures with drivers of those 
measures in management by objectives 
systems may bring many of these benefits. 
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On the other hand, benefits may also be due 
to increased communication and 
understanding of aims and means in these 
organisations, with greater consensus 
leading to a closer alignment of behaviour 
and the achievement of strategic priorities. 
 
These results also suggest that firms are 
able to utilise the concept of cause and 
effect in practice despite criticism presented 
in the accounting literature towards the 
concept (e.g. Norreklit 2000). Further 
research could assess the exact mechanisms 
that lead cause and effect logic to be 
beneficial for designers and users of 
performance management systems, and 
how theoretical inconsistencies in the 
concept are overcome in practice. In 
studying cause and effect, it was also 
observed that strategy maps are not used 
extensively in Australia (only 17% of 
respondents). Moreover, there seemed to be 
a lack of knowledge about this concept in 
practice (40% of respondents had not heard 
of the concept). Additional research could 
consider the alternative methods used by 
practitioners and there related outcomes, 
including modelling based on statistical 
associations (e.g. Bryant, et.al, 2004), 
adaptations of the DuPont formula tree, or 
other practice derived processes. 
 
Second, linking compensation to non-
financial measures of the BSC seemed not 
to be a prerequisite for the BSC to be 
beneficial. This result is more easily 
understood when various alternative ways 
of using the BSC are considered. Malmi 
(2001) found that some organisations used 
the BSC mainly to provide information for 
managerial decision making. This type of 
use does not require compensation to be 
linked to measures. Tuomela (2005) 
discussed an organization which used BSC 
for strategic learning. For such use linking 
compensation to measures may not be the 
best approach. Similarly, the research by 
Chenhall (2005) suggests that in an 
uncertain external environment links to 
compensation may limit the extent to which 
the BSC can be used for strategic learning 
as compensation links reduce flexibility and 
interactive use.  
 
Other firms use the BSC as a basis for 
management by objectives (see Malmi, 
2001 and Speckbacher, et.al, 2003). 
Organisations applying this type of use are 
more likely to benefit from linking 
compensation to measures. However, it 
may be that linking compensation to only 
financial outcome measures of BSC is 
sufficient. The results may also reflect 
difficulties in using often less than precise 
non-financial measures as a basis for 
compensation2. Furthermore, even if non-
financial measures are used as a basis for 
compensation, the relative weight of them 
in incentive schemes may be low. If that is 
the case, we should not expect to see major 
differences in benefits received. 
 
An additional explanation of these results 
may be that in many organisations the BSC 
is not linked to activities that actually drive 
strategic outcomes. If that is the case, then 
providing a link between compensation and 
non-financial measures will have no effect 
on strategic outcomes. The outcomes 
produced will be the ones that the measures 
capture. This could explain why 
compensation does not have a great effect 
on its own, but seems to be beneficial when 
cause and effect is matched with 
compensation. Further, the analysis found 
that certain benefits (stronger consideration 
for non-financial performance drivers, 
better consideration of stakeholders, 
enhanced investment in intangibles and 
enabling managers to question the 
relevance of strategic objectives) were more 
often present in companies linking 
compensation to non-financial measures 
than in those that did not. A company 
seeking such outcomes through the BSC 
use may benefit from linking compensation 
to non-financials, with these linkages based 
on cause and effect logic. 
 
                                                 
2 Economic theory suggests that in situations were the 
accuracy of measuring a dimension of performance is 
diminished, the costs of tying compensation to those 
measures may outweigh any benefits gained (Bonner 
and Sprinkle, 2002, pp331-2).  However, the 
literature still suggests that it is beneficial to link 
monetary incentives to at least one dimension.  The 
logical default is likely to be the financial dimension 
of the BSC. 
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Future research on the compensation link 
should control for the particular purposes 
the BSC is used for. When used for 
managerial control, researchers should 
assess the role of the BSC as part of the 
wider organisational control package. Is it 
more beneficial, ceteris paribus, to tie 
compensation to BSC measures only, or 
should BSC measures be only a part of the 
total compensation package? How this is 
different in various levels of the 
organisational hierarchy? With further 
regard to the hierarchy, should 
compensation be linked to the BSC of the 
particular level or unit in question, or 
should part of the compensation be based 
on aggregate corporate or SBU level 
measures? Do these compensation decisions 
depend on the how BSC is cascaded down?  
 
Another set of questions relate to how 
measures within a BSC are tied to 
compensation. Should all measures of the 
BSC be reflected in a compensation scheme 
as the informativeness principle 
(Holmström, 1979; Prendergast, 1999) 
seems to suggest? Or would this cause 
problems e.g. in terms information 
overload, confusion between conflicting 
measures and the need for weighting or 
costs of maintaining measures? If only a 
few indicators are selected as a basis for 
compensation, is it only financial measures 
or some mix of financial and non-financials 
of BSC that should be included? (see e.g. 
Widener, 2006). What is the weighting of 
financial and non-financial measures in the 
incentive system that produces the best 
outcomes in a given circumstance? 
  
Third, our study suggests that the majority 
of Australian organizations have 
implemented the BSC through out the 
whole organisation, but this does not seem 
to be related to any benefits. This result is 
hard to interpret. As the majority of firms 
have cascaded the BSC to lower levels of 
the organisation, there is likely to be some 
benefit in doing so. It may be that the study 
has not been able to capture these benefits 
properly with the measurement instruments 
used. Furthermore, organizational structure, 
size and the type of activities are likely to 
have an impact on whether cascading to 
team or individual level is appropriate. 
Comparing two groups of firms which have 
selected an optimal extent of their 
application should not yield differences in 
benefits. This question is also related to the 
type of BSC use. Proper cascading is 
thought to be crucial for management by 
objectives type of use and therefore the 
further down you cascade, the greater the 
influence on day-to-day activities you 
should expect.  
 
On the other hand, using BSC for decision-
making at executive levels requires data to 
be collected throughout the organisation, 
but does not necessarily require scorecards 
to be applied at lower levels. Respondents 
might, however, consider the production of 
measurement information for corporate 
reporting purposes as BSC use at lower 
levels. High corporate level use and the 
large extent of implementation may suggest 
that the BSC is used as a corporate 
reporting mechanism in Australian 
organisations. Further research should 
consider the nature of use of BSC in 
Australia and seek to explain why there is a 
high extent of implementation throughout 
the hierarchy in Australia and not in other 
countries. 
 
Finally, compared to studies in many other 
regions, the adoption rate of the BSC 
appears to be low in Australia. Is it that 
Australians are more sceptical towards 
management fashions or is the structure of 
the supply-side of management innovations 
somehow different from other western 
countries? This might provide an interesting 
avenue of further research for those 
interested in innovation diffusion. 
 
The primary implication for practitioners 
considering implementation of a Balanced 
Scorecard are the benefits and performance 
outcomes gained from considering cause 
and effect relationships. While an initial 
advantage of the BSC over more traditional 
measurement systems was to focus 
managers’ attention on a restricted, but 
broad, set of critical performance measures, 
the results of this study suggest that higher 
performance outcomes will be achieved 
only if the measures selected are tied 
together in a causal framework. Including 
cause and effect in the design of the BSC is 
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likely to demand greater communication 
between organisational levels, transparency 
of accountabilities, more focused attention 
on long-term strategic goals and a better 
understanding of the leading, and 
actionable, drivers of performance.  
 
Although these reasons are speculative, 
these processes may account for the 
differences in BSC benefits and 
performance outcomes. A second key 
implication is that the BSC is not a “one 
size fits all” system. It is clear that there is 
significant variation in the way in which the 
BSC has been implemented in 
organisations.  In particular, it appears that 
the BSC may be used equally well as a 
management by objectives system, where 
managers are held accountable for 
outcomes and have compensation tied to 
Scorecard measures, or as a strategic 
information tool, where the emphasis is 
placed on learning and problem solving.  
Reasons for adoption, and desired benefits, 
will dictate how the BSC is implemented 
and constructed.  Following from this, firms 
that consider their current BSC ineffective 
should review the design elements of the 
BSC to see whether these match the desired 
purpose, rather than discarding the system 
altogether. 
 
This study, like any empirical research, has 
its limitations. First, as only a limited 
number of design and use characteristics 
were considered, this leaves the potential 
for omitted correlated variables. This might 
be of some concern for the first proposition 
relating to cause and effect logic. Given the 
criticism of this concept, it may be the 
processes, communication patterns or some 
other mechanisms that are driving the 
results, rather than just the existence of 
cause and effect logic in BSC design. 
Second, it may be considered that the use of 
single item constructs is too simplistic to 
capture the variables of analysis. This is not 
necessarily the case, as it has been shown 
empirically in other academic disciplines 
that single-item measures are appropriate in 
circumstances where items are well 
understood by survey respondents (see for 
instance Bergkvist and Rossiter, 2007), 
although a deeper analysis of the use of the 
BSC, as suggested above, would likely 
require the use of multiple-item constructs. 
Finally, generalisation of the findings to 
other settings must be done with caution, 
particularly given the unique findings 
concerning adoption and extent of 
implementation in Australian firms that 
suggests the use of the BSC in this context 
differs to that in other national settings. 
Despite these limitations, the study provides 
a number of interesting findings that have 
both academic and practical relevance, and 
provides a strong impetus for future 
research on the design and use of the BSC. 
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